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Abstract
This article analyzes the eﬀects of intellectual property rights in a quality-
ladder model of endogenous growth in which incumbent firms preemptively
innovate in order to keep their position of leadership. Unlike in models with
leapfrogging, granting forward protection, and imposing a non-obviousness
requirement reduces growth. In the main case where entrants and incum-
bents have free access to the same R&D technology, infinite protection
against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes
growth. If entrants have to engage in costly catch up before they can un-
dertake frontier R&D, growth is maximal for a finite (expected) length of
protection against imitation. (JEL L40, O31, O34)
Keywords: Intellectual property rights, cumulative innovation, persistent lead-
ership, forward protection, non-obviousness requirement
⇤Published in European Economic Review, Volume 80, November 2015, Pages 194–213,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.09.005
© 2015. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
†Contact: christian.kiedaisch@econ.uzh.ch, +41 44 634 37 26, Department of Economics,
Schönberggasse 1, CH-8001 Zurich, Switzerland.
1
1 Introduction
This article studies the eﬀects of diﬀerent intellectual property right (IPR) policies
in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. In contrast to most models of this
type, where entrants undertake all R&D, so that there is leapfrogging, this article
analyzes the case in which incumbent firms innovate preemptively in order to
prevent being replaced by entrants, and in which there is persistence in leadership.
Empirical studies show that incumbent firms carry out a considerable number
of innovations and remain the industry leaders for a substantial period of time.
Camerani and Malerba (2007) study patents granted by the European patent oﬃce
to firms from six countries (France, Italy, Germany, Sweden, USA and UK) in 13
sectors between 1990 and 2003. Table 1 shows the fraction of patents that were
granted to technological entrants who patented for the first time in a given sector.
Table 1
Technological entrants share per sector and period (patents)
Sector 1990-91 1992-93 1994-95 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03
Audiovisual technology 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.17
Biotechnologies 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.19
Information technology 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.21
Machine tools 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.27
Macromolecular chemistry 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13
Materials; Metallurgy 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.24
Medical engineering 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.20
Optics 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.18
Pharmaceuticals; Cosmetics 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17
Semiconductors 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.15
Space technology; Weapons 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.22
Control/Measures/Analysis 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24
Telecommunications 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.10
Source: Camerani and Malerba (2007), Table 6
As those fractions are relatively small in all sectors and periods, firms that innovate
persistently within one sector obtain a disproportionate share of all patents.
Córcoles and Triguero (2013) study the persistence of innovation using firm
level panel data on R&D expenditures and innovation of Spanish manufacturing
firms for the period 1990 - 2008. They find that on average 72.6% of the innovators
in one year also innovated in the subsequent year and that 58.1% also innovated
five years later. Persistence was even higher in R&D decisions: on average 87.56%
of the firms that undertook R&D in one year also did so in the following year and
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78.55% also undertook R&D five years later. Numerous other empirical studies find
high levels of firm innovation persistence when measured with patent, innovation,
or R&D data.1
Garcia-Macia et al. (2015) study U.S. manufacturing data from 1992, 1997
and 2002. Using a growth model, they indirectly infer that most growth resulted
from innovation by incumbents and from improvements of existing varieties, car-
ried out mostly by the incumbents who had previously produced them. Given that
intellectual property rights are used to stimulate innovation, it is therefore impor-
tant to understand how they should be designed in order to encourage cumulative
innovation in a context where a large fraction of innovations are carried out by
incumbent firms.
The following model setup is used in order to generate persistent leadership:
innovation is assumed to increase the quality of diﬀerent intermediate goods that
are used to produce a final consumption good. There is free entry into R&D in each
intermediate good sector, and the R&D productivity of entrants and incumbents
is the same. Contrary to most leapfrogging models, it is assumed that the R&D
technology is characterized by decreasing returns at the industry level and that
incumbents move first in the R&D game.2 By increasing her own R&D eﬀort, an
incumbent can therefore decrease the profitability of R&D undertaken by entrants
in her sector and preempt entry.
The analysis mainly focuses on the case of quasi-drastic innovations in which
an incumbent who has undertaken two successive innovations (is two steps ahead)
can charge the unconstrained monopoly price and earns larger profits than an
entrant who has to compete with the previous incumbent in an intermediate good
market. As incremental profits are lower for an incumbent than for entrants due
to the Arrow replacement eﬀect, incumbents have a lower incentive to innovate
than entrants if they do not face any entry pressure. Under free entry, however,
incumbents find it profitable to preempt entry as they value not being replaced
and keeping their (two step) lead more than entrants value entry (which brings a
1Using an innovation panel data set on German manufacturing and service firms for the period
1994 – 2002, Peters (2009) finds that in manufacturing (services), about 89% (about 70%) of the
innovators in one year also innovated in the next year. Jang et al. (2008) calculate transition
probabilities using patent data for the period 1990-2003. They find that between 70 and 80% of
firms in the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that applied for more than 6 patents in one
year also applied for more than 6 patents two years later. Foster et al. (2013) find that there
is high persistence among the top 200 R&D performing firms in the US. They document that
the firms that were among the top 200 in 1976 still made up more than half of the total R&D
expenditures of the top 200 firms in 2003 and more than 35% of total US R&D expenditures in
2003. Le Bas and Scellato (2014) provide an overview over 33 recent empirical papers on firm
innovation persistence and classify 25 (2) of them as finding high (low) innovation persistence.
2Even without the latter assumption, a similar Walrasian equilibrium can be considered, as
explained in footnote 19.
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one step lead). Therefore, incumbents carry out all the R&D in equilibrium and
there is persistent leadership.
The analysis builds on Denicolò (2001), who introduces the preemption mecha-
nism of Gilbert and Newbery (1982) into a quality-ladder growth model, but does
not study the role of IPRs. In equilibrium, the amount of R&D that an incumbent
undertakes in order to prevent being replaced depends positively on the value of
an innovation for an entrant expecting to become the new industry leader upon
entry3.
Within this setting of persistent leadership, the following IPR policies are an-
alyzed: (i) forward protection (new innovations infringe the IPRs (patents) of
previous innovators), (ii) a non-obviousness requirement (minimal inventive step),
and (iii) protection against imitation (duration until rivals can copy a protected
technology). The analysis generates three main results:
First, granting forward protection reduces growth. Under forward protection,
entry is discouraged as incumbents can block entrants’ innovations. Even though
it is assumed that forward protection allows incumbents and entrants to collude
in prices, entrants never obtain larger profits than without forward protection and
without collusion. Therefore, granting forward protection unambiguously reduces
entry pressure, the amount of R&D undertaken by incumbents, and growth. This
result diﬀers from that obtained by O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004), who study
forward protection in the leapfrogging case in which patents for any two succeed-
ing innovations are held by diﬀerent firms. In their setting, forward protection
also discourages innovation by leading to more backloaded profit flows. However,
entrants can benefit from price collusion with infringed incumbents more than
what they lose from profit backloading. As a result, the overall eﬀect of forward
protection on growth can be positive.
The second main result is that imposing a non-obviousness (patentability) re-
quirement reduces growth. The reason for this is that such a requirement reduces
entry pressure and therefore the amount of R&D that incumbents need to under-
take in order to preempt entry and that, for given R&D spending, incumbents
themselves find selecting the growth-maximizing step size profitable. This result
diﬀers from those obtained in the context of leapfrogging, where imposing a non-
obviousness requirement can increase innovation by reducing the threat that inno-
vators lose their monopoly power due to “creative destruction” by marginal follow-
on innovations (see O’Donoghue (1998), O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004), and
Hunt (2004)).
Finally, it is shown that full protection against imitation for any size of the
3The prediction that incumbents invest more in R&D if entry pressure increases is supported
by an empirical study of Czarnitzki et al. (2014), who use a dataset from the German manufac-
turing sector.
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lead maximizes growth. This is the third main result. In order to allow for less
than full protection, it is assumed that with a certain hazard rate, competitors can
copy a given invention and compete away all profits. As in Acemoglu and Akcigit
(2012), the general case of state-dependent intellectual property (IP) protection is
considered in which the rate at which protection against imitation expires can de-
pend on the size of the lead of an IP holding firm. Unlike in Acemoglu and Akcigit
(2012), however, growth is not maximal under state dependent IP protection, but
rather in the case of full uniform protection, i.e. if protection never expires.
The last result, however, needs to be qualified: If there is trade secrecy in the
sense that entrants have to incur some fixed catch-up costs before they can use the
state-of-the-art R&D technology, it is shown that incumbents can preempt entry
without doing any R&D. In this case, no innovation takes place in equilibrium
under full IP protection against imitation4. If, however, IP protection expires
with a positive probability, so that incumbents lose their lead from time to time,
this regularly creates a neck and neck situation in which firms innovate and try
to become the next leader in an industry. Because of that, the rate of growth is
maximal for an intermediate probability of IP expiration (i.e. if patents are of
finite expected duration). This result diﬀers from that obtained in the case of
leapfrogging, where, absent forward protection, full protection against imitation
maximizes growth5, even if there are catch-up costs due to trade secrecy.
In the following, the related literature is discussed in more detail. The question
of how antitrust policies should be designed in innovative industries where entrants
expect to become the next incumbents is analyzed by Segal and Whinston (2007),
who find that entrants should be well protected against incumbents in most cases
in order to guarantee that profit flows for successful innovators do not become too
backloaded. They therefore identify the same eﬀect as O’Donoghue and Zweimüller
(2004), who show that innovation increases if profit flows become more front-
loaded. Chu (2009) studies a generalized version of the model of O’Donoghue
and Zweimüller (2004) and quantitatively estimates the eﬀect of blocking patents
on R&D using US data. O’Donoghue et al. (1998) analyze the role of forward
protection in a quality-ladder model with leapfrogging and compare the case of
short and broad to long and narrow patents, assuming that forward protection
allows firms to collude and that investment opportunities arrive at an exogenous
rate.
Bessen and Maskin (2009) and Llanes and Trento (2012) analyze models of
sequential innovation in which patents grant blocking power over follow-on inno-
4In order to obtain this result, simplifying assumptions about the form of the R&D technology
are made.
5Llobet and Suarez (2013), show that innovation and welfare can be maximal for an interme-
diate strength of protection if patents at the same time grant protection against imitation and
(entry-discouraging) forward protection.
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vations and in which licensing is ineﬃcient due to asymmetric information. As-
suming that firms can appropriate some surplus in the final goods markets even in
the absence of IP protection, they show that innovation can be larger when there is
no (forward) IP protection. In both articles, it is assumed that innovation does not
lead to the replacement of the previous technology, so that issues like the Arrow
replacement eﬀect or the possibility of preemption that arise in a quality-ladder
context are not considered. The main diﬀerence between the above-mentioned
and the present article is the fact that the former do not study the case in which
incumbents undertake R&D.6 While several articles have analyzed the conditions
under which (some) persistence in leadership can arise in quality-ladder models7,
the role of IP protection has only received little attention in settings in which
incumbent firms also innovate.
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) analyze a model of step-by-step innovation in
which there is a race between two firms in each sector and where the laggard
first has to catch up through duplicative (but non-infringing) R&D before he can
undertake frontier R&D. They argue that IP protection should be stronger for firms
that have a larger technological lead over their rivals. In their model, IP protection
aﬀects innovation by aﬀecting the incremental profits that the two incumbent firms
obtain from moving one step ahead.8 Reducing IP protection solely for firms with
a smaller lead can therefore increase innovation incentives for laggards and the
rate of growth by increasing incremental profits. In contrast, there is free entry
into (frontier) R&D in the model analyzed here, and while reducing IP protection
in a state-dependent way can induce firms with a lower lead to innovate at a faster
rate, it comes at the cost of reducing the value of entering and the amount of R&D
incumbents need to undertake in order to preempt entry. This entry-discouraging
6Segal and Whinston (2007) also study the case of innovation by leaders but do not analyze
the role of IPRs in this context.
7In most quality-ladder growth models (like Aghion and Howitt (1992)), the case of leapfrog-
ging is analyzed, although incumbents are actually indiﬀerent about their share in total R&D if
the R&D sector is competitive and markets are Walrasian, so that there might as well be some
persistence in leadership (see Cozzi (2007)). In many continuous-time patent race models (like
Reinganum (1983 and 1985)) where marginal R&D costs are increasing at the firm-, but not at
the industry level, preemption is not possible and incumbents invest less in R&D than challengers
in the standard case with simultaneous moves and drastic innovations. In a similar setup with
fixed costs of entering the R&D sector, Etro (2004) finds that in the case where there is free
entry and industry leaders move first in the R&D game (are Stackelberg leaders), they do more
R&D than entrants so that there is some persistence in leadership. Denicolò (2001), on which
the current article builds, analyzes the case where preemption is possible due to decreasing R&D
productivity at the industry level and finds that there is persistent leadership if innovations are
non-drastic and incumbents move first. Fudenberg et al. (1983) analyze conditions under which
preemption is possible and when there can be competition in patent races.
8It is assumed that parameters are such that the laggard never stops innovating and never
drops out of the market.
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eﬀect is so strong that, contrary to Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), reducing IP
protection in a state-dependent way always reduces growth compared to the case
of full uniform IP protection. While this result accords with the findings of first-
generation quality ladder models with free entry (based on Aghion and Howitt,
1992), it is derived in a setup where innovation rates can be lead dependent, giving
rise to composition eﬀects that otherwise only occur in step-by step models, but
not in models with leapfrogging.
Denicolò and Zanchettin (2012) study a growth model with non-drastic inno-
vations and constant returns to R&D in which incumbents and entrants simulta-
neously decide about the sizes of their R&D investments and in which there is no
preemption. Unlike the present article, they assume that the R&D productivity of
incumbents is larger than that of entrants so that incumbents might find it prof-
itable to innovate, in spite of the Arrow replacement eﬀect. They find that there
can be stochastic leadership cycles, meaning that incumbents are not replaced im-
mediately, but undertake some R&D and (on average) advance to a certain lead
before they are replaced. The authors show that requiring successful outsiders to
pay a licensing fee to the previous incumbent in this setting can increase the rate of
growth, even if such forward protection does not facilitate collusion. Introducing
state-dependent patent breadth (modeled as varying price caps) is shown to aﬀect
the share of R&D the incumbent undertakes, but it has no eﬀect on the rate of
growth.9
The article is structured as follows: in Section 2, the model is introduced and
in Section 3, the equilibrium is derived. Section 4 studies the eﬀects of diﬀerent
IPR policies like forward protection (Section 4.1), a non-obviousness requirement
(Section 4.2) and the case of expiring IP protection (Sections 4.3 and 4.4). Section
5 concludes.
2 Model Setup and Equilibrium
This analysis is based on the quality-ladder growth model of Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004). While Denicolò (2001) analyzes a one-sector version of this model,
there is a continuum of sectors in the version of the model studied here. This
allows for non-stochastic growth, but does not aﬀect the qualitative results.
9Other papers in which (some) persistence in leadership results because incumbents are as-
sumed to be more productive in doing R&D than entrants are Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999)
and Segerstrom (2007). In Ledezma (2013) there can be persistent leadership as incumbents
can increase the R&D costs of entrants by biasing the direction of R&D. In Acemoglu and Cao
(2015), only incumbents are capable of undertaking incremental innovations, while entrants en-
gage in more radical innovations. Athey and Schmutzler (2001) analyze conditions under which
dominance of an incumbent firm arises if there is ongoing firm-specific investment, but no entry
into frontier R&D.
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2.1 Preferences
There is a measure one of identical, infinitely lived individuals. Time is continuous
and intertemporal preferences are given by
U(⌧) =
1ˆ
t=⌧
c (t) e r(t ⌧)dt (1)
with c(t) denoting consumption at time t. As intertemporal preferences are linear,
the equilibrium rate of interest is constant and equal to the rate of time preference
r. Moreover, individuals are risk neutral, so that all assets must yield the same
instantaneous expected net rate of return r in equilibrium10.
2.2 Goods Production
There is a final good y which can be consumed, used for research, or used to
produce intermediate goods, of which there is a continuum of measure one. The
quality of each intermediate good ! can be increased step-wise through innovation.
It is assumed that each innovation increases the quality by the factor q > 1.
Normalizing the initial quality of all intermediate goods at time 0 to one, the
highest available quality of an intermediate good ! at time t is given by qk(!,t), with
k(!, t) indicating the number of innovations that have been achieved in industry
! by time t.
The final good is produced using labor L and intermediate goods of vintages
v 2 {0, 1, ..., k(!, t)} and quantities x(v,!, t) according to the following constant
returns production function:
y(t) = L1 ↵
ˆ 1
!=0
24k(!,t)X
v=0
qvx(v,!, t)
35↵ d!, 0 < ↵ < 1
In order to produce one unit of any type of intermediate good, one unit of the final
good is needed as an input. Both the final good and labor are supplied in perfectly
competitive markets, while intermediate goods can be protected by IPRs. If more
than one firm supplies intermediate goods in sector !, there is price competition.
Since diﬀerent vintages of intermediate goods are perfect substitutes within their
sector, only the newest vintage v = k(!, t) with the highest available quality is
used in equilibrium. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor at each
point in time so that the total labor supply is given by L = 1. Therefore, the final
good production function reduces to
10The qualitative results of the article are robust to the introduction of more general intertem-
poral preferences (see the last paragraph of Appendix A2).
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y(t) =
ˆ 1
!=0
⇥
qk(!,t)x(k,!, t)
⇤↵
d! (2)
The final good is used as the numeraire.
2.3 The R&D Sector
Given k is the newest vintage of the intermediate good in sector !, the next
vintage k + 1 can be invented if R&D is undertaken. The instantaneous arrival
rate  !(k + 1) with which the innovation occurs is given by
 !(k + 1) = min
(✓
n!
cgk
◆ 1
1+✏
,  ¯
)
(3)
where n! denotes the total amount of the final good used for R&D in sector !
and g ⌘ q ↵1 ↵ > 1. c > 0 is an inverse measure of R&D productivity and ✏ > 0
indicates the extent of decreasing returns to R&D at the industry level.  ¯ > 0 is
an upper bound that the innovation arrival rate cannot exceed due to technological
reasons. This upper bound only becomes relevant in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of the
analysis where, for reasons of tractability, the limit case of constant returns to
R&D (✏ ! 0) is considered. The total R&D costs in terms of the final good are
therefore given by
C( !(k + 1)) =
⇢
cgk 1+✏! if  ! <  ¯
1 if  ! >  ¯ (4)
In order to obtain a balanced growth path (BGP), these costs increase by the
factor g if the vintage (quality-level) k of the good increases by one step due to an
innovation11. There is free entry into frontier R&D, meaning that all firms have
access to the same R&D technology and are capable of undertaking frontier R&D
in all sectors without having to duplicate previous innovations of other firms first.
As ✏ > 0, marginal and average R&D costs increase in  !. If more than one
firm does R&D, it is assumed that firm i obtains the innovation with arrival rate
 !i =  !i ! if its share in total R&D costs in sector ! is given by  !i. The R&D
costs of firm i are then given by Ci( !i(k + 1)) = cgk !i ✏!. A firm therefore
increases the R&D costs of all other firms if it increases the (industry) arrival rate
 ! by increasing its own R&D spending. A reason for these decreasing returns
might be that it is impossible to perfectly coordinate all R&D activities, implying
that the probability of duplicative research (even within one firm) increases if more
11As every innovation turns out to increase profits by the factor g (see equations 6 and 7),
R&D costs have to increase by the same factor in order to obtain a BGP on which  ! is constant.
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R&D is undertaken in a given sector12. It is assumed that incumbent firms have a
first-mover advantage in R&D due to their visibility, meaning that entrants at each
instant of time first observe the R&D eﬀort undertaken by an incumbent before
they decide about their own R&D eﬀort.
2.4 Intellectual Property (IP) Protection
It is assumed that an inventor of a new vintage of a good gets IP protection on
it, allowing her to exclude other firms from producing her vintage. Initially, IP
protection is assumed to be of infinite duration (e.g., patents are infinitely lived).
The eﬀects of forward protection, of a non-obviousness requirement and of expiring
IP protection are discussed in Section 4.
2.5 Equilibrium Concept and Steady State
It is assumed that the perfectly competitive final good and labor markets clear
at any point in time. In the imperfectly competitive intermediate goods markets,
firms behave strategically in the races for new innovations and Markov Perfect
Equilibria are analyzed in which strategies only depend on payoﬀ-relevant state
variables13.
The analysis focuses on balanced growth paths. While productivity-enhancing
innovations arrive at random intervals within a given intermediate good industry,
the economy grows smoothly as there is a continuum of intermediate good indus-
tries, implying that there is no randomness in the production of the final good
due to the law of large numbers. Along a BGP, the output of the final and of all
intermediate goods, consumption, the wage rate, and total R&D expenditures all
grow at a constant rate. In the case where IP protection expires, the fraction of
industries in which the industry leader leads by a certain step size and the average
innovation rate within an industry are constant.
3 General Equilibrium
3.1 Goods Market Equilibrium
Profit maximization of perfectly competitive firms in the final goods sectors implies
that the demand for the latest vintage k(!, t) of an intermediate good of type !
12In case of duplication, an increase in the R&D eﬀort exerted by one firm increases the
expected R&D costs per obtained IPR (patent) of rivals as either only one firm gets IP protection
on the innovation or as the profits derived from the IPR have to be split among several innovators.
13Non-stationary endogenous cycle equilibria that can occur in quality-ladder models are not
considered.
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as a function of its price p(k,!, t) is given by
x(k,!, t) = ↵
1
1 ↵ gkp(k,!, t) 
1
1 ↵ (5)
The demand for intermediate good ! is independent of the prices of intermediate
goods in other sectors. The demand function has the constant elasticity 11 ↵ and
shifts up by the factor g ⌘ q ↵1 ↵ if an innovation, which increases k by one step,
occurs. Producers of diﬀerent vintages of intermediate goods within the same sec-
tor can be treated as if they were supplying the same good, measured in eﬃciency
units, but at a diﬀerent cost (in terms of the final good) per unit: the costs of
vintage k   l are therefore ql times larger than those of vintage k.
The firm that supplies the newest vintage k of the intermediate good in industry
! maximizes profits under the constraint that the price has to be so low that no
rival firm in the same industry finds it profitable to enter. If the industry leader
has obtained l successive IP protected innovations and therefore has a lead of
l steps, entry is deterred if p(k,!, t)  ql holds14. Profits, that are given by
⇡(k,!, t) = (p(k,!, t)  1) x(k,!, t), with x(k,!, t) taken from equation 5, are
therefore maximized for the unconstrained monopoly price pm = 1↵ if
1
↵  ql and
for the limit price p = ql if ql < 1↵ . Let s denote the minimal lead size which allows
a leading firm to engage in (unconstrained) monopoly pricing. Formally, s is an
integer implicitly defined by the following condition:
qs 1 <
1
↵
 qs
Equilibrium profits can be derived as:
⇡m(k,!, t) = (1  ↵)↵[(1+↵)/(1 ↵)]gk(!,t) ⌘ ⇡mgk(!,t), l   s (6)
⇡l(k,!, t) =
 
ql   1 ↵1/(1 ↵)q  l1 ↵ gk(!,t) ⌘ ⇡lgk(!,t), l < s (7)
Profits increase in the vintage k of the good and increase in the lead l relative
to the closest competitor if l < s, but are independent of l if l   s, i.e. if firms
are unconstrained monopolists. In order to simplify the notation, the definitions
⇡m ⌘ (1  ↵)↵ 1+↵1 ↵ and ⇡l ⌘
 
ql   1 ↵ 11 ↵ q  l1 ↵ are used in the following and
referred to as “normalized profits”.
14The marginal costs of producing an eﬃciency-equivalent to one unit of a good of vintage k
(the marginal costs of which are one) are equal to ql for producers of vintage k   l, so that they
cannot break even if the price lies below these marginal costs.
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Incremental Profits
In order to understand a firm￿s incentive to innovate, one needs to know how
undertaking an innovation changes the firm￿s profits depending on the size of the
firm￿s initial lead. Taking into account that an innovation increases the vintage
and also the lead l by one step, incremental profits are given by
4⇡(k, l,!, t) = ⇡(k + 1, l + 1,!, t)  ⇡(k, l,!, t)
The following Lemma shows how, for a given vintage k of an intermediate good,
incremental profits depend on the initial lead of a firm in the industry.
Lemma 1. a): If q < 1↵  q2 (Condition A), incremental profits fall in the
initial lead l if 0  l  2. For l   2, firms are unconstrained monopolists and
incremental profits are independent of l.
b): Given that qs = 1↵ (s   1), incremental profits decrease in l if 0  l  s.
For l   s, incremental profits are independent of l.
c): For any step size q > 1, incremental profits are larger for entrants (l = 0)
than for unconstrained monopolists.
Proof. See Appendix A1
Given that q < 1↵  q2 (Condition A) holds, innovations are quasi-drastic.
This means that each single innovation is non-drastic so that firms with a one
step lead engage in limit pricing, while a firm with a two or more step lead is an
unconstrained monopolist. In this case, incremental profits are largest for entrants
(l = 0), lower for incumbents with a one step lead (l = 1), and even lower for
unconstrained monopolists with an initial lead of two or more steps (l   2). Part
b) of the Lemma (used in Section 4.1) shows that the result that undertaking an
innovation increases profits less for firms with a larger initial lead l also holds if
the step size is such that firms become unconstrained monopolists with a lead of
exactly s steps. Part c) is needed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
The feature that incremental profits decrease in the size of the lead arises
in many contexts and more general settings and is the source of the "Arrow re-
placement eﬀect" (Arrow (1962)) and the "escape competition eﬀect" (Aghion et
al. (2001)), which are widely discussed in the literature15. In order to keep the
derivations and the exposition simple, the following analysis focuses (unless other-
wise stated) on the case of quasi-drastic innovations, which arises under Condition
A.
15Denicolò (2001), on which this article builds, however, does not prove that incremental profits
fall in the lead in the setting analyzed here.
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3.2 Innovation Race
The expected value of being the leading firm that supplies vintage k of the interme-
diate good in industry ! is denoted by V1(!, k, t) if the firm has a one step lead and
by V2(!, k, t) if the firm has a lead of two or more steps. V1(!, k, t) < V2(!, k, t)
must hold as firms with a one step lead have lower profits in period t (⇡1(!, k, t) =
⇡1gk(!,t) < ⇡2(!, k, t) = ⇡m(!, k, t) = ⇡mgk(!,t)) and can only catch up and obtain a
more profitable two step lead if they undertake an innovation in the future. Along
a BGP, the expected value of being the leading firm with an l step lead increases
by the factor g if an innovation takes place, so that Vl(!, k + 1, t) = gVl(!, k, t).
In the following, the equilibrium innovation behavior in an intermediate good in-
dustry ! is studied. The indices ! and t are dropped for convenience, as there are
no interactions between industries and as time only aﬀects payoﬀs in an indirect
way by aﬀecting k.
Suppose that k is the newest vintage of an intermediate good in an industry.
The expected value that an entrant obtains from introducing generation k + 1 is
then given by V1(k + 1) = gV1(k), as it brings a one step lead over the previous
incumbent. An entrant i chooses the innovation arrival rate  i in order to maximize
expected discounted profits
V0(k) =  iV1(k + 1)  cgk i ✏
It is therefore profitable for entrants to do R&D and to select  i > 0 as long as the
average (industry) R&D costs, that are given by a( ) = cgk ✏ (= C( )  , see equation
4), do not exceed V1(k + 1)16. As there is free entry into R&D, V1(k + 1)  cgk ✏
therefore has to hold as entrants would otherwise find it profitable to do more
R&D and to increase  .
The case where V1(k + 1) < cgk ✏ can only hold if the incumbent finds it
profitable to do all of the R&D in the industry and to increase   beyond the point
where the average R&D costs start to exceed V1(k + 1) and where entrants drop
out of the innovation race. This would require that, absent any threat of entry,
the incumbent values obtaining the next innovation more than entrants do. This
is, however, not the case, as incremental profits are lower for the incumbent than
for entrants, independently of whether the incumbent has an initial lead of one or
two steps (see Lemma 1)17. Therefore V1(k+ 1) < cgk ✏ does not hold in the case
16The average and not the marginal costs in the corresponding industry ! matter as a single
firm does not take into account that by increasing its own R&D eﬀort it increases the R&D costs
of all other firms, so that it still finds entry profitable if the marginal (industry) costs are higher
than V1(k + 1), as long as the average costs do not exceed V1(k + 1).
17Without any threat of entry, the incumbent takes into account that by increasing the inno-
vation rate, she not only increases the chance of discovering the next vintage of the good but
also the chance of displacing her currently supplied vintage from the market, which makes her
less willing to invest in R&D than entrants.
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studied here18 and the following free entry condition needs to hold with equality.
V1(k + 1) = cg
k( ⇤)✏ (8)
Rearranging this condition gives  ⇤ =
⇣
V1(k+1)
cgk
⌘ 1
✏ , implying that the equilibrium
innovation rate  ⇤ in an industry is an increasing function of the value of an
innovation for an entrant, V1(k + 1). The fact that V1(k + 1) determines  ⇤,
however, does not imply that entrants actually carry out R&D in equilibrium.
Persistent Leadership
As it is assumed that incumbents move first (are Stackelberg leaders) in the inno-
vation race, entrants adjust their R&D spending after observing the level of R&D
that the incumbent undertakes. As equation 8 always holds, one unit of R&D
undertaken by the incumbent crowds out one unit undertaken by entrants, leaving
the industry innovation rate  ⇤ unchanged. An incumbent can therefore reduce
the instantaneous probability of replacement from  ⇤ to (1   ) ⇤ if she bears the
costs  cgk( ⇤)1+✏ and if she innovates herself with arrival rate   ⇤.
While the R&D costs are the same for entrants and the incumbent, the in-
cumbent values not being replaced and obtaining the next innovation herself more
than an entrant values entry: while successfully innovating entrants have to com-
pete with the previous incumbent in the intermediate good market and only get
the value V1(k + 1) upon entry, the incumbent gets the larger value V2(k + 1) in
the case of a successful innovation, as it guarantees her unconstrained monopoly
power.
With the total innovation rate  ⇤ pinned down by the free entry condition,
incumbents lose their current value of incumbency, which is given by V2(k) in the
case of a two step lead and by V1(k) in the case of a one step lead with the hazard
rate  ⇤. As this replacement rate is independent of the share of R&D and of the
innovation rate   ⇤ of the incumbent, the incumbent has incentives to increase her
R&D eﬀort as long as   < 1 as she values obtaining the next innovation herself
more than entrants do. Because of this "eﬃciency eﬀect" (that was first analyzed
by Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and introduced in the growth model presented
here by Denicolò (2001)), the incumbent therefore fully preempts entry by doing
as much R&D as needed to push the average R&D costs up to the value of an
innovation for an entrant.
Lemma 2. Given that the incumbent moves first in the innovation race, she un-
dertakes exactly as much R&D as needed to discourage R&D of entrants in her
18In Section 4, cases are discussed in which incumbents with a one step lead can have higher
incentives to innovate than entrants.
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industry. Consequently, only the incumbent innovates and there is persistent lead-
ership
As the same reasoning applies when incumbents need a lead of more than two steps
in order to obtain unconstrained monopoly power (s > 2), there is also persistent
leadership in this more general case19.
3.3 Equilibrium Innovation and Growth
In order to derive the equilibrium innovation rate  ⇤ from the free entry condition
 ⇤ =
⇣
V1(k+1)
cgk
⌘ 1
✏ , we need to first derive V1(k + 1), the value of an innovation for
an entrant. As successful entrants anticipate becoming the new incumbents and
extending their lead to two and more steps, this value again depends on the value
V2(k + 2) = g2V2(k) of having a lead of two or more steps. V2(k) can be derived
from the following arbitrage condition:
rV2(k) = ⇡mg
k   cgk ( ⇤)1+✏    ⇤V2(k) +  ⇤V2(k + 1)
The first term on the right hand side indicates per period profits derived from
supplying vintage k of the intermediate good and the second term the R&D costs
of the incumbent who does the entire R&D. The third and fourth terms on the right
hand side indicate that, if an innovation occurs with the arrival rate  ⇤, the firm
stops supplying vintage k and loses the value V2(k), but at the same time starts
supplying vintage k+1 and gains the value V2(k+1). Replacing V2(k+1) = gV2(k)
and solving for V2(k) gives
V2(k) =
⇡mgk   cgk ( ⇤)1+✏
r    ⇤ (g   1) (9)
In the following, it is assumed that r >  ⇤(g   1) (Condition B) holds in order
for V2(k) to be bounded. The value of being an incumbent with a one step lead
supplying vintage k of the good can be derived from the arbitrage condition
19A formal proof of Lemma 2 is provided in online Appendix B. The equilibrium analyzed here
can either be interpreted as one where the incumbent is a Stackelberg leader in the R&D game
or as a Walrasian equilibrium where the total demand for R&D inputs is equal to the supply
and in which the auctioneer allocates all R&D to the incumbent who is willing to pay at least as
much for it as the entrants. As the entrants earn zero profits in equilibrium, they are indiﬀerent
about the amount of R&D that they undertake and, if an incumbent would do less R&D than
the equilibrium level, the Walrasian auctioneer would simply assign a larger amount of R&D to
entrants in order to obtain the equilibrium (see Cozzi (2007) for a more detailed discussion). A
similar equilibrium might also be obtained as the outcome of an auction in which incumbents
and entrants simultaneously bid for R&D inputs.
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rV1(k) = ⇡1g
k   cgk ( ⇤)1+✏    ⇤V1(k) +  ⇤V2(k + 1)
which takes into account that this incumbent initially earns the lower profits ⇡1gk
and then advances to a two step lead with the next innovation. This arbitrage
condition can be solved for
V1(k) =
⇡1gk   cgk ( ⇤)1+✏ +  ⇤V2(k + 1)
r +  ⇤
Inserting V2(k + 1) = gV2(k) from equation 9 into this condition, plugging V1(k +
1) = gV1(k) into Equation 8 and dividing by gk, the free entry condition can be
written as:
g
 
⇡1   c ( ⇤)1+✏
 
r +  ⇤
+
 ⇤
r +  ⇤
g2
 
⇡m   c ( ⇤)1+✏
 
r    ⇤ (g   1) = c ( 
⇤)✏ (10)
This equation implicitly defines the equilibrium innovation rate  ⇤ in a given sector.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium innovation rate  ⇤ is the same in all sectors and
the equilibrium rate of growth G⇤ of the economy is given by G⇤ = (g   1) ⇤.
Both  ⇤ and G⇤ increase in ⇡1, ⇡m and g and decrease in r and c. In the
case where incumbents need a lead of s > 2 steps in order to obtain unconstrained
monopoly power,  ⇤ and G⇤, moreover, increase in the (normalized) profits ⇡l that
incumbents obtain for lead sizes 1 < l < s. In order for an equilibrium to exist,
r > G⇤ (Condition B) must hold, which is always satisfied if r is suﬃciently large.
Proof. See Appendix A2
The intuition for these results is straightforward: Without the threat of entry,
incumbents have a lower incentive to innovate than entrants due to the replacement
eﬀect and therefore only conduct as much R&D as needed to preempt entry when
entry is possible. This preemptive R&D level depends positively on entry pressure,
i.e. on the incentives of entrants to undertake R&D in order to enter and to become
the next incumbent. Entry pressure decreases in the R&D costs c and increases in
the value of an innovation for an entrant which depends positively on (normalized)
profits ⇡1 (or more generally ⇡l) and ⇡m and negatively on the rate of interest r
due to a discounting eﬀect. When g increases, entry pressure increases as each
innovation then leads to a larger increase in profits. Taking into account that
g ⌘ q ↵1 ↵ and that ⇡1 (and also ⇡l for l < s) depends positively on q,  ⇤ therefore
increases in the innovation step size q. As the equilibrium rate of growth of output
is given by G⇤ = (g   1) ⇤, all parameters have the same qualitative eﬀect on G⇤
that they have on  ⇤.
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4 The Eﬀects of diﬀerent IPR Policies
4.1 Forward Protection
It is now assumed that an entrant￿s IPR that covers vintage k + 1 of a certain
intermediate good infringes on the IPR of the previous vintage k of the same good
(but not on vintage k   1), so that the incumbent can block the production of
vintage k+1 of the good by an entrant. An IPR therefore grants protection against
future superior innovations, labeled “forward protection”. It is assumed that there
is still a research exemption so that entrants are permitted to undertake frontier
R&D as long as they do not produce the invented goods (for an analysis of the
case where there is no research exemption, see Section 4.4.2 ). Moreover, it is
assumed that the antitrust authority allows entrants and incumbents to collude in
prices if they negotiate a licensing agreement in the case of blocking IPRs but that
collusion is prohibited if there is no forward protection. Incumbents are assumed
to always collude with entrants if they find it profitable to do so once entry has
occurred. Therefore, they cannot ex ante commit not to collude ex post.
Proposition 2. Forward protection reduces growth. This result generalizes to
the case where s > 2 innovation steps are needed in order to obtain unconstrained
monopoly power and to the case where qs = 1↵ , s   2, and where forward protection
allows the blockage of R > 1 future innovations.
Proof. See Appendix A3
This is the first main result of the article and the intuition (for the simple
case) is the following: while absent forward protection entrants earn the profits
⇡1gk+1 if they obtain a one step lead, they maximally earn the incremental profits
⇡m(gk+1   gk) by which their innovation increases monopoly profits in the case
of forward protection. This is because the incumbent has the possibility to keep
producing her old vintage and earning profits ⇡mgk (until the entrant obtains a two
step lead) if she blocks the entrant from producing vintage k + 1 and is therefore
only willing to accept a collusive licensing agreement with the entrant if it gives
her at least the same, leaving less than ⇡m(gk+1   gk) per period for the entrant.
As ⇡m(gk+1   gk) < ⇡1gk+1 holds due to declining incremental profits (Lemma 1),
forward protection therefore reduces profits of entrants in the period where they
have a one step lead. Once they have obtained a two step lead, profits are again
given by ⇡mgk+1, as in the case without forward protection. Therefore, forward
protection reduces the value of an innovation for an entrant, entry pressure, and
growth.
This result diﬀers from those obtained in models where there is leapfrogging,
like O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) and O’Donoghue et al. (1998). In these
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models, firms never lead by more than one step so that, absent forward protec-
tion, profits for entrants are given by ⇡1gk+1 until they are replaced by the next
innovation, k + 2. Forward protection then has two eﬀects: by giving blocking
power to the incumbent, it forces the entrant to pay licensing fees to the previous
incumbent, but allows him to recoup licensing fees from the next entrant. For
constant markups, blocking power then leads to a more backloaded (and therefore
more heavily discounted) profit flow for an entrant and can be shown to reduce
the incentives to innovate. At the same time, forward protection allows firms
to collude and to increase the joint profits that accrue to entrants and replaced
incumbents who still get licensing revenues. If the backloading eﬀect is not too
large (because the interest rate is low or because entrants are strong bargainers),
forward protection can therefore increase the value of an innovation for an entrant
and the equilibrium innovation rate. In the case of persistent leadership, this can-
not happen for the following reasons: forward protection then also has a blocking
eﬀect, as entrants have to pay licensing fees to previous incumbents, but do not
expect to obtain any licensing fees in the future, as they plan to become the new
industry leaders and to preempt all entry in the future20. Moreover, collusion only
allows to increase joint profits in the case where an entrant has obtained a one
step lead, but not anymore when he has advanced to a two step lead, as he then
obtains unconstrained monopoly profits even absent forward protection. As an
incumbent with blocking power never leaves a share of the collusive profits that
exceeds ⇡1gk+1 to the entrant when l = 1, entry is unambiguously discouraged
under forward protection as the entrant does not reap any of the collusive gains.
It should be noted that simply permitting entrants and incumbents to collude
in prices (or to sell their IPRs or exclusive licenses to each other) without granting
forward protection unambiguously increases growth in both the case of persistent
leadership and in that of leapfrogging21. The reason for this is that by granting
blocking power to incumbents, forward protection greatly discourages entry by
increasing the incumbents’ bargaining power.
The analysis is restrictive in the sense that it only focuses on cumulative in-
20Forward protection, however, also brings delayed rewards in the form of reduced R&D costs
as it reduces the entry-deterring innovation rate  ⇤. The blocking eﬀect of forward protection
is similar to the eﬀect that imposing entry fees would have: It is simple to show that such fees
that entrants have to pay upon entry into a product market lead to reduced entry pressure and
growth.
21In the case of persistent leadership, collusion allows avoiding the phase of competition when
entrants have a one step lead and to increase their profits above the level ⇡1gk+1 that they can
obtain absent collusion. This increases entry pressure and growth. As entry no longer reduces
joint profits in the case of collusion, the incumbent values not being replaced and obtaining the
next innovation equally much as the entrants value entering, as she still gets a share of the surplus
in the case of entry. Therefore, the incumbent is indiﬀerent about her share in total R&D and
there need not be persistent leadership anymore.
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novations along given quality ladders ! without allowing for product innovations
that increase the set of intermediate goods. If the inventions of the first vintages
(k = 1) in each intermediate good industry ! were also endogenized, forward
protection would encourage these product innovations, as it increases profits for
first innovators by giving them blocking power over follow-on innovations. Then,
a trade-oﬀ would arise as forward protection would encourage product innovation
while discouraging quality-improving follow-on innovations (see Chu et al. (2012)
and also Denicolò (2002)). If growth is mainly driven by improvements of existing
varieties, as Garcia-Macia et al. (2015) argue, the eﬀects that intellectual property
policy might have on growth through the channel of product innovations might,
however, be relatively small.
4.2 Non-Obviousness Requirement
So far it has been assumed that firms cannot influence the size of the quality
improvement q that an innovation brings and that q is such that a two (or s) step
lead allows charging the unconstrained monopoly price 1↵ . This section looks at the
case where firms are capable of targeting diﬀerent innovation step sizes q > 1 at
diﬀerent costs. Unconstrained monopoly power (a quality diﬀerence larger than 1↵
relative to the closest competitor) can therefore be attained by either undertaking
many little steps (small q) or a few large steps (large q). Incremental profits
resulting from an innovation are now endogenous and increase in the step size q.
In this setting, there is an additional instrument that intellectual property policy
can use: a non-obviousness requirement that sets a lower bound q on the inventive
step below which an inventor cannot obtain IP protection.
It is assumed that the R&D technology is the same in all intermediate good
sectors !. The R&D costs in terms of the final good for a firm i = j that wants to
improve upon the currently highest quality Q!(t) of an intermediate good by the
factor qj (> 1) and that targets the arrival rate  j are given by
Cj(!, t) = c (Q!(t)) (
↵
1 ↵) j (qj)
 X
i
 i  (qi)
!✏
with @ (q)@q > 0 and with
P
 i  (qi) indicating the overall R&D eﬀort in sector
!. For given overall R&D spending, targeting a larger inventive step qj therefore
implies a lower hazard rate  j. Given that ✏ > 0, R&D costs for firm j increase
in the overall R&D eﬀort in the industry. Due to this assumption, an incumbent
can again preempt entry by undertaking a large enough amount of R&D in order
to increase the entrants’ R&D costs22. In order to allow for balanced growth,
22It is therefore assumed that only the total R&D eﬀort of the incumbent matters for the
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the growth factor (Q!(t)) (
↵
1 ↵) is included due to which R&D costs increase in
line with profits when the quality Q!(t) of the newest vintage of an intermediate
good ! increases. It is assumed that it is prohibitively costly to target a drastic
innovation (q > 1↵) which gives an entrant unconstrained monopoly power in a
single step.
In this more general setting, the eﬃciency eﬀect is present again: as for any
size of the lead, an incumbent earns larger profits due to larger monopoly power,
she again values not being replaced and obtaining the next innovation herself
more than an entrant values entry. While entrants and incumbents might find it
optimal to select diﬀerent step sizes for their innovations, it is never more costly
for incumbents to innovate than for entrants, as they always have the option
of selecting the same step size as entrants. Therefore, incumbents again find
it profitable to preempt entry and there is persistent leadership (as in Denicolò
(2001)). Due to the fact that for any step size, incremental profits are lower for
unconstrained monopolists than for entrants (see Lemma 1, Part c), incumbents
who have advanced to a lead that is large enough to earn unconstrained monopoly
profits never want to do more R&D than needed to preempt entry (as, whatever
step size is most profitable for incumbents, incremental profits for entrants are
larger if they select the same step size).
In order to simplify the notation, the indices ! and t are omitted in the follow-
ing. Expected profits of an entrant who targets step size qe and innovation rate  e
in order to obtain a one step lead over the initial quality level Q are given by
V0(Q) =  eV1(Q, qe)  cQ( ↵1 ↵) e (qe)
 
 e (qe) +
X
i 6=e
 i  (qi)
!✏
with V1(Q, qe) denoting the maximum value that the entrant can derive from ob-
taining a one step lead. V1(Q, qe) not only depends on the size qe of the first
inventive step, but on the whole path of inventive steps and innovation rates that
the entrant finds optimal to choose in the future in order to advance his lead and
to preempt entry of others. The free entry condition (V0(Q) = 0) that must be
satisfied in an industry where the incumbent is an unconstrained monopolist and
undertakes all the R&D is therefore given by
V1(Q, qe) = cQ(
↵
1 ↵) (qe) ( m  (qm))
✏ (11)
entrants’ R&D costs, but not the combination of step size and innovation rate that the incumbent
chooses. This assumption seems plausible in settings where the price of (uniform) R&D inputs
increases if demand for them increases and where it is possible to preempt entry by simply
buying enough of these inputs in order to increase their price. If, however, the incumbent￿s
R&D activity aﬀected the entrants’ R&D profitability by increasing the risk of duplication, the
combination of step size and innovation rate would also matter.
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This condition pins down the R&D eﬀort  m  (qm) that the incumbent under-
takes in order to preempt entry as an increasing function of the maximized and
normalized value that an innovation has for an entrant, V˜1 ⌘ V1(Q,qe)
Q
↵
1 ↵  (qe)
.
Without any non-obviousness requirement, entrants choose the sequence and
sizes of inventive steps (including the first one, qe) that maximize the present dis-
counted value of their R&D activity (and therefore also V˜1). Therefore, any binding
non-obviousness requirement that restricts the R&D decisions of entrants and of
incumbents who have not yet reached a lead large enough to be unconstrained mo-
nopolists decreases the maximized value V˜1 that entrants derive from undertaking
R&D, and therefore reduces entry pressure and the total R&D eﬀort  m  (qm) of
incumbents who are unconstrained monopolists. Moreover, the following can be
shown:
Lemma 3. For a given R&D eﬀort  m  (qm), unconstrained monopolists find it
optimal to select the growth-maximizing innovation step size q⇤m = q⇤.
Proof. See Appendix A4
Lemma 3 therefore implies that imposing a non-obviousness requirement cannot
increase growth by increasing the innovation step size that unconstrained monop-
olists choose. As such a requirement at the same time reduces the R&D eﬀort of
industry leaders, we can state the following:
Proposition 3. Imposing a non-obviousness requirement reduces equilibrium growth.
This result diﬀers from the previous literature. O’Donoghue and Zweimüller
(2004) and Hunt (2004) show that, in the case of leapfrogging, imposing a patentabil-
ity (non-obviousness) requirement can increase the rate of innovation, growth, and
welfare. O’Donoghue (1998) reaches the same conclusion in a model where even
incumbent firms do some R&D in equilibrium, but in which preemption is not
possible, so that there is no persistent leadership. The following mechanism is
at work in these models: when an entrant selects the profit-maximizing combina-
tion of step size and innovation arrival rate for a given R&D spending, he does
not take into account that increasing the latter (but not the former) reduces the
expected profits of the previous incumbent by leading to a faster rate of “cre-
ative destruction”. Imposing a non-obviousness requirement can therefore reduce
the threat that innovators will lose their monopoly power due to marginal (low
step size) follow-on innovations and can, ceteris paribus, prolong the duration of
monopoly power. This eﬀect turns out to be stronger than the direct innovation-
discouraging eﬀect stemming from increased R&D costs (which is partially oﬀset
by larger markups and profits resulting from a larger step size), so that impos-
ing a (weak) non-obviousness requirement can increase innovation in the case of
leapfrogging.
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In the case of persistent leadership, allowing entrants to target small innovation
step sizes and thereby increasing the risk of creative destruction for the incumbent
has diﬀerent eﬀects: as the incumbent wants to keep her unconstrained monopoly
power, she responds to increased entry pressure by increasing her own R&D spend-
ing. As entry does not occur in equilibrium and as incumbents find it profitable
to target the growth-maximizing step sizes, marginal innovations on which firms
could obtain IP protection are never carried out and industry profits are never
reduced below the monopoly level23.
Expiring Intellectual Property Protection
In order to make the model more tractable, the limit case in which there are
constant returns to R&D (✏ = 0) is studied in the following sections. As for ✏ = 0,
the current innovation rate is undetermined even though the free entry condition
V1(k + 1) = cgk pins down the expected future innovation rates, it is assumed
that the equilibrium is selected that results as the limit if ✏ ! 0. Given that
the incumbent has unconstrained monopoly power, the current and the expected
future innovation rates coincide in this preemption equilibrium and are given by
 ⇤2.
With constant returns to R&D the innovation rate might not always be pinned
down by the free entry condition and some firms might find it profitable to increase
their R&D eﬀort infinitely for certain lead sizes. Because of this, it is assumed that
there is an upper bound  ¯ (as specified in equations 3 and 4) that the innovation
rate cannot surpass and that is selected in these cases. In order to avoid the
uninteresting cases where, absent the threat of future entry, not even entrants find
it profitable to undertake R&D or where even incumbents with a two step lead
want to achieve the maximal innovation rate  ¯, the following condition is assumed
23Chu and Pan (2013) study the eﬀects of forward protection in a model with leapfrogging and
endogenous innovation step sizes. They show that (marginally) increasing the blocking power of
incumbent firms can push entrants to pursue larger innovation step sizes and can thereby increase
innovation. In the case of persistent leadership, increasing the blocking power of incumbents
cannot have such a positive eﬀect, as it either reduces entry pressure by reducing profits for
entrants that infringe on the incumbent’s IPRs (see Section 4.1) or by pushing entrants to target
larger step sizes than they would find optimal absent forward protection.
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to be satisfied24 (Condition C):
⇡m
 
gk+1   gk 
r
< cgk <
⇡1gk+1
r
4.3 State-dependent Intellectual Property Protection
This section analyzes the eﬀects of IP expiration in the basic model in which IPRs
protect against imitation, but in which there is no forward protection and no col-
lusion and in which the step size is constant and exogenous. Like in Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2012), the general case of "state-dependent intellectual property protec-
tion" is analyzed in which the probability of IP expiration can depend on whether
a firm has a one step or a two (or more) step lead over its rivals. The IPRs of a
firm with a one step lead are assumed to expire with the instantaneous Poisson
arrival rate  1, and those of a firm with a two step lead with the instantaneous
arrival rate  2. When IP protection expires in an industry, the newest vintage of
the intermediate good falls in the public domain, allowing competitors to copy it
and to fully catch up25. Profits therefore fall to zero in the case of IP expiration.
In the case of persistent leadership, V1(k) (that means the value of being one
step ahead) and the value V2 (k) of being two (or more) steps ahead can be de-
rived from the following arbitrage conditions, where  l denotes the innovation rate
chosen by an incumbent with an l step lead:
rV2(k) = ⇡mg
k   cgk 2    2V2(k) +  2 (V2(k + 1)  V2(k))
rV1(k) = ⇡1g
k   cgk 1    1V1(k)   1V1(k) +  1V2(k + 1)
Taking into account that Vl(k + 1) = gVl(k) along a BGP, we can solve for:
V1(k + 1) = g
k+1 ⇡1   c 1
r +  1 +  1
+
 1
r +  1 +  1
gk+2
⇡m   c 2
r +  2    2 (g   1) (12)
A firm with a one step lead sets its innovation rate  1 as a function of the IP
expiration rates  1 and  2 which determine the relative profitability of a two step
lead compared to a one step lead.
24Absent the threat of future entry and with infinite IP protection, the value of an innovation
for an entrant is given by 4V = V1(k + 1) = ⇡1gk+1r and that of an incumbent with a two step
lead by 4V = V2(k + 1)   V2(k) = ⇡m(g
k+1 gk)
r . As the marginal (and average) R&D costs
are given by cgk, firms that maximize expected profits  (4V   cgk) therefore find it optimal to
increase   if 4V > cgk and to not undertake any R&D if 4V < cgk.
25This specification implicitly assumes that IP protection on second-newest vintages never
expires. The case in which firms with a two step lead can lose this lead for a one step lead
(because their IPR on the second-newest vintage expires) is not considered.
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Lemma 4. Given that ⇡m(g 1)r < c <
⇡1g
r (Condition C) and that  ¯ is suﬃciently
large, the following cases arise:
i): If  1 > g⇡1c   r and if  2 < g
2⇡m
(g+1)c   r, a firm with a one step lead selects
innovation rate  ⇤1 =  ¯ >  ⇤2
ii): If  1  g⇡1c  r and if  2   1+ g(⇡m ⇡1)c , a firm with a one step lead selects
the preemptive innovation rate  ⇤1 =  ⇤2 <  ¯
iii): If  1  g⇡1c   r and if  2 >  1 + g(⇡m ⇡1)c , a firm with a one step lead does
not do any R&D ( ⇤1 = 0), so that there is leapfrogging.
Proof. See Appendix A5
As ⇡1g > ⇡2g   ⇡1 (Lemma 1),  1 >  2 needs to hold in Regime (i), meaning that
IP protection needs to expire suﬃciently more quickly in the case of a one step
lead than in the case of a two step lead in this regime. This makes a two step
lead relatively more profitable, so that firms with a one step lead do the maximal
amount of R&D,  ¯, in order to reach a two step lead as quickly as possible.
In Regime (ii), firms with a one step lead value not being replaced and reaching
a two step lead more than entrants value entry, but they do not want to do more
R&D than necessary to preempt entry so that  ⇤1 =  ⇤2. In Regime (iii), IPRs
expire so much faster in the case of a two step lead than in the case of a one
step lead that firms with a one step lead do not find reaching a two step lead
worthwhile and stop innovating. In Regimes (i) and (ii), the innovation rate in the
case where the IPR on the currently newest vintage of an intermediate good has
expired ("zero step lead") is given by  ⇤0 =  ⇤2. While entrants might undertake
R&D in this case, the innovation rate is the same as the preemptive level  ⇤2 that
incumbents select in order to prevent entry, as it is pinned down by the same free
entry condition V1(k + 1) = cgk. In Regime (ii), the innovation rate is therefore
independent of the size of the lead, while it is higher in industries with a one step
lead than in industries with a zero or a two step lead in Regime (i). In Regime (iii),
entrants undertake all R&D, and the innovation rate is given by  ⇤, independently
of whether IP protection on the currently newest vintage of the good in a given
sector has expired or not. We can now analyze the eﬀect of IP expiration on
equilibrium growth G⇤ and derive the third main result of the article.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Condition C holds and that  ¯ is suﬃciently large.
Given a change in  i does not lead to a switch between regimes, the equilibrium rate
of growth G⇤ decreases in  1 in all Regimes and decreases in  2 in Regimes (i) and
(ii). If a marginal shift in parameters leads to a switch from Regime (ii) to Regime
(i), there is a discontinuous increase in G⇤, while there is no discontinuity in the
case of a switch between Regimes (ii) and (iii). G⇤ is maximal if  1 =  2 = 0, that
means under full uniform IP protection.
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Proof. See Appendix A6
Reducing IP protection by increasing  1 or  2 decreases the value of an in-
novation for entrants and entry pressure in all regimes (with the exception that
 2 does not aﬀect outcomes in Regime iii)). This directly implies a reduction in
the equilibrium innovation and growth rates in Regimes iii) and ii), and also a
decrease in the innovation rates  ⇤2 =  ⇤0 in the cases of a two and a zero step
lead in Regime (i). In Regime (i), there is, however, also a "composition eﬀect"
which goes in the opposite direction: increasing  2 can now increase the fraction
of industries in which there is a one step lead and in which the innovation rate is
maximal.26 However, this composition eﬀect is not strong enough to overcompen-
sate the negative eﬀect that an increase in  2 has on  ⇤2 =  ⇤0, so that an increase in
 2 still leads to a reduction in the equilibrium rate of growth G⇤i in Regime i). G⇤i
is therefore maximal if  2 = 0, in which case the composition eﬀect disappears as
leaders never lose a two step lead. But given that  2 = 0, the growth rate decreases
in  1, as increasing the rate with which IP protection for firms with a one step
lead expires merely reduces the value of an innovation for entrants and therefore
the amount of R&D that incumbents need to undertake in order to preempt entry.
Consequently, growth is maximal under full uniform IP protection and, unlike in
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), cannot be increased by reducing IP protection in a
state-dependent way (i.e. by increasing  1 more than  2).
Given that  1 and  2 are already positive and at a certain threshold value, a
small increase in  1 can, however, lead to an increase in growth by inducing a
switch from Regime (ii) to Regime (i). The reason for this is that such a decrease
in IP protection for firms with a one step lead can induce them to switch their
strategy from only undertaking the amount of R&D that is necessary to preempt
entry to undertaking the maximal amount of R&D in order to reach a two step
lead as quickly as possible. There is therefore a nonlinear relation between  1
and the rate of growth so that the "incentive eﬀect" identified by Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2012) is at work at a specific threshold value of  1.
4.4 Potential Perils of strong Protection against Imitation
In the previous section the assumption was made that entrants and incumbents
have free access to the same R&D technology. It was shown that in this case
reducing the strength with which IPRs protect against imitation (i.e. increasing
 1 or  2) cannot increase the rate of growth through a composition eﬀect, i.e. by
increasing the fraction of industries in which R&D incentives are higher due to a
lower lead. In the following subsections, cases are analyzed in which this is diﬀerent
and where reducing IP protection can increase growth through such a composition
26Increasing  1 always decreases this fraction (see Appendix A6).
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eﬀect. It is again assumed that there is no forward protection and that the step
size is constant and exogenous.
4.4.1 Trade Secrecy
So far it has been assumed that there is free access to the R&D sectors and that
entrants have complete knowledge about the currently newest technologies and can
directly start doing frontier R&D. While, ideally, a firm is only granted IP (patent)
protection when it discloses the functioning of its innovation, firms often succeed in
keeping part of their knowledge secret so that competing firms first have to engage
in some duplicative catch-up R&D before they can start conducting frontier R&D.
It is therefore assumed that entrants first have to spend the fixed catch-up costs
Fgk before they can undertake frontier R&D directed at inventing vintage k + 1
in a given industry27. It is assumed that the incumbent can observe an entrant’s
catch-up and thus can adjust her R&D spending after observing entry into the
R&D sector. IP protection expires with the constant hazard rate     0 and,
in the case of expiration in a given industry, the newest available vintage of the
intermediate good falls in the public domain and is supplied at the marginal cost
of one28. In this case, profits fall to zero, and it is assumed for simplicity that
all knowledge about the currently newest vintage of the good falls in the public
domain.
The equilibrium can be derived through backward induction. Given the in-
cumbent in a certain industry has a lead of one or two steps, and entry into the
corresponding R&D sector has occurred, the preemption equilibrium results in
which the incumbent does enough R&D to completely discourage R&D by the
entrant and in which the entrant earns zero profits. Expecting this, no entrant
finds it profitable to pay the catch-up costs Fgk, so that there is no entry into the
R&D sector in an industry in which the currently newest vintage of the good is
protected by IPRs. This, however, implies that there is no entry pressure and that
incumbents do not need to undertake any R&D in order to preempt entry. Due
to Condition C, incumbents thus stop innovating after having obtained a two step
lead and might even find it profitable to stop innovating after having obtained a
one step lead.
If IPRs have expired and if the currently newest vintage of an intermediate
27In the online Appendix B, the somewhat related problem where two R&D stages must be
completed in order to obtain a marketable final innovation is analyzed. It is shown that in such
a case, growth is maximal if entrants are allowed to obtain IP protection on the intermediate
R&D inputs generated in the first R&D stage while incumbents are not.
28This specification is chosen for reasons of simplicity, and neglects the case where firms with
a two step lead lose this lead for a one step lead because their IPR on the second-newest vintage
expires. It is therefore implicitly assumed that IPRs on second-newest vintages never expire.
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good is in the public domain, firms might, however, find it profitable to undertake
R&D in order to become the next leader, given that IP protection does not expire
too quickly. Denoting the equilibrium innovation rates in the case of an l step
lead by  ⇤l and the innovation rate in the case where IPRs have expired by  ⇤0, the
following proposition holds:
Proposition 5. Given that Condition C holds, three regimes arise:
Regime A): if    ⇡mg ⇡1c   r,  ⇤0 =  ⇤1 =  ¯ and  ⇤2 = 0
Regime B): if ⇡mg ⇡1c   r <    ⇡1gc   r,  ⇤0 =  ¯ and  ⇤1 =  ⇤2 = 0
Regime C): if   > ⇡1gc   r,  ⇤0 =  ⇤1 =  ⇤2 = 0
The equilibrium rate of growth is given by:
G⇤ =
8><>:
(g   1)  ¯ ( +2 ¯)
( ¯+ )2
in Regime A
(g   1)  ¯ 
 ¯+ 
in Regime B
0 in Regime C
Given that ⇡mg ⇡1c   r > 0 and  ¯(2g⇡m (2+g)⇡1c   r) +
 
⇡mg ⇡1
c   r
 2
> (<)0, G⇤ is
maximal if   = ⇡mg ⇡1c   r (  = ⇡1gc   r). If ⇡mg ⇡1c   r < 0, G⇤ is maximal if
  = ⇡1gc   r > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A7
There is therefore an inverted-U relation between the rate of growth and the
strength of IP protection29. If IPRs are fully protected (the sub-case of Regime
A where   = 0), the growth rate is zero, as there is no entry pressure and as
monopolists rest on their laurels. Reducing the strength of IP protection then
increases the fraction of industries in which no firm has a lead over its rivals due
to expired IPRs and in which innovation incentives are maximal, but also the
fraction of industries in which the incumbent only has a one step lead and might
(in Regime A) find it profitable to do R&D in order to obtain a two step lead. If,
however, IP protection is too weak (Regime C), the growth rate is again zero, as
appropriability is so low that firms do not find it profitable to do R&D, even if the
currently newest vintage of an intermediate good is in the public domain.
29It should be noted that this result holds for any size of F , as long as incumbents can observe
catch-up and entry and can readjust their R&D eﬀort ex post. There is therefore a discontinuity
in the eﬀect that IP protection has on growth when F falls from ✏ > 0 to 0. This discontinuity,
however, disappears if incumbents are not capable of observing the catch-up (which might be
plausible if catch-up costs Fgk are low): then, they actually have to undertake R&D in order to
preempt entry, so that the analysis is again very similar to that in the previous sections. The
fixed catch-up costs then only decrease entry pressure while stronger IP protection (a lower  )
again encourages innovation.
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It should be noted that this result only arises in the present setup where in-
cumbents can (and want to) preempt entry, but not in models with leapfrogging in
which only entrants innovate. In the case of leapfrogging, full protection against
imitation (  = 0) always maximizes innovation and growth, as it encourages firms
to be the first to overcome the fixed catch-up costs and to then win the innovation
race in which they cannot be preempted by an incumbent anymore.
4.4.2 Lack of Research Exemption and diﬀerent Forms of Preemption
Even if entrants are capable of undertaking frontier R&D without having to catch
up first, broad intellectual property protection granted to previous innovators and
the lack of a research exemption might make it illegal for entrants to do fron-
tier R&D without first negotiating licensing contracts with previous innovators.
If these contracts specify a positive up front licensing fee and if the incumbent
can observe licensing, such a fee, however small it might be, plays the same role
as the catch-up costs in the section above and leads to a complete blockage of
entry. Therefore, imposing a research exemption for entrants seems to be particu-
larly important to encourage cumulative innovation when incumbents can innovate
preemptively.
Proposition 5 holds more generally in any situation where an incumbent (or
several incumbents colluding on R&D decisions) does not face any entry pressure30
and it is in line with the findings of Horowitz and Lai (1996) and Cadot and
Lippman (1995) who assume that only one incumbent firm is capable of doing
R&D31. It was assumed in the analysis above that incumbents can only discourage
entrants’ R&D by doing R&D themselves. There might, however, be cases in
which incumbents can increase the R&D costs of potential entrants, or decrease
their expected benefits of innovating, without doing R&D themselves. If there is
an upward-sloping supply curve for R&D labor in an industry, incumbents might,
for example, hire a certain amount of R&D labor in order to increase the wages
that rivals need to pay, but employ the researchers in other areas than R&D. In the
case where knowledge is to some extent tacit and where only researchers who were
involved in past R&D are capable of doing frontier R&D, incumbents can simply
oﬀer them long term contracts or make them sign non-compete clauses in order to
prevent them from doing research for entrants. While preemption is not costless
30Given the constant-return R&D technology with the upper bound  ¯,  0 is the same in the
cases where one or several firms capable of doing R&D.
31If only a single firm is capable of doing R&D in a given industry, the result even extends to
the case where innovations are drastic (i.e. where q > 1↵ ). If
⇡m(g 1)
r < c <
⇡mg
r , such a firm
only has incentives to innovate when IP protection has expired. Then, growth is maximal for
the expiration rate   = ⇡mgc   r at which firms still find it profitable to set  ⇤0 =  ¯ and that
maximizes the fraction of industries in which IP protection has expired and in which innovation
takes place.
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in these cases, the result that incumbents stop innovating once they have obtained
a suﬃcient lead is therefore the same. Because of that, the rate or growth is again
zero if IPRs are fully protected and might increase if IP protection is decreased.
5 Conclusions
While most of the literature analyzing the role of intellectual property rights in
models of cumulative innovation focuses on the case of leapfrogging, this article
studies the case of persistent leadership. This is relevant from an empirical per-
spective, since a considerable amount of R&D is undertaken by firms that innovate
on a permanent basis. Three main results come out of this analysis: first, that
forward protection reduces growth and second, that imposing a non-obviousness
requirement reduces growth. Both of these results diﬀer from those obtained in
models with leapfrogging. The third main result is that full uniform protection
against imitation, and not state-dependent IP protection, maximizes growth. The
main driving force behind these results is that the corresponding policies reduce
entry pressure and the amount of R&D that incumbents need to undertake in
order to preempt entry.
A limitation of the analysis is that it focuses on growth and not on the welfare
eﬀects of diﬀerent policies, which are not straightforward in quality-ladder models
in which growth can be excessive from a welfare point of view (for a detailed
analysis, see Denicolò and Zanchettin (2014)). Given that growth is excessive, it
is, however, not recommendable to reduce it by introducing forward protection or
a non-obviousness requirement if it is instead possible to reduce the maximal price
that unconstrained incumbents can charge32 and to diminish growth in this way.
The reason for this is that only the latter policy reduces monopoly distortions
while the other policies mainly reduce entry pressure without aﬀecting the price
setting power of unconstrained incumbents, who supply all intermediate goods in
equilibrium33.
The model generates persistent leadership by assuming that innovations are
non-drastic and that incumbents are capable of preempting entry, but – unlike
other models – it does not rely on the assumption that incumbents are more
productive in undertaking R&D than entrants. Within this setting, entry can
occur if IP protection has expired or if entrants and incumbents can collude or sell
their IPRs. Therefore, the model is also consistent with cases in which there is less
than perfect persistence. If, however, entry occurs because innovations are drastic,
32This can for example be done by imposing price regulations or by reducing the breadth of IP
protection, forcing incumbents to engage in limit pricing in order to prevent entry of competitors
supplying non-infringing imitates of inferior quality.
33A formal welfare analysis is provided in online Appendix B.
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because entrants’ R&D productivity is larger than that of incumbents, or because
preemption is not possible (or not an optimal strategy for incumbents) due to
technological or informational reasons, the mechanisms that arise in leapfrogging
models become more relevant. As the eﬀects of IPR policies diﬀer in models
with leapfrogging and persistent leadership, it might be beneficial to use diﬀerent
policies in sectors that diﬀer substantially in the persistence of innovative activities.
In order to study such questions in more detail, it would be interesting to analyze
a more general model in which entry plays a more prominent and realistic role.
This extension is left for future research.
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Appendix
A1: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Part b) is presented first (in three sub-steps) as Part a) builds on it. “k”
instead of “k(!, t)” is used to save on notation.
b1): For l   s, 4⇡(k, l) = ⇡m(k) (g   1) can be derived from equation 6 and
is independent of l.
b2): For 0  l  s   1, 4⇡(k, l) = ↵ 11 ↵ gkq  l1 ↵
h 
ql+1   1  gq  11 ↵   ql + 1i
can be derived from equation 7 and falls in l if 4⇡(k, l) < 4⇡(k, l   1) (starting
from l   1). The latter inequality holds if 
ql+1   1  gq  11 ↵   ql + 1 < q 11 ↵ h ql   1  gq  11 ↵   ql 1 + 1i
Replacing g = q
↵
1 ↵ , this implies the inequality q   1 < q 11 ↵ (q   1), which is
satisfied as q > 1 and ↵ < 1.
b3): For l = s, 4⇡(k, l = s) = ⇡m(k) (g   1), and for l = s  1,
4⇡(k, l = s 1) = ⇡m(k)g ⇡(k, s 1), with ⇡(k, s 1) = (qs 1   1)↵ 11 ↵ gkq  s 11 ↵
(see equation 7). As ⇡(k, s   1) < ⇡m(k), 4⇡(k, l = s   1) > 4⇡(k, l   s) holds,
so that  ⇡ falls if l increases from l = s  1 to l = s.
a):  ⇡ falls in l for l   1 (see sub-steps b3 and b1 ). If l rises from 0 to 1,  ⇡
falls if (Condition (Co.) 1):
4⇡(k, 0) = ⇡(k + 1, 1) > 4⇡(k, 1) = ⇡m(k + 1)  ⇡(k, 1)
which holds if
M ⌘
⇣
(q   1)↵ 11 ↵ q  11 ↵
⌘ (g + 1)
g
> ↵
1+↵
1 ↵ (1  ↵)
Co. 1 holds for q = 1↵ (see b3 ) and also for q =
1p
↵ (see b2 ), so that it also holds
for all values 1p↵ < q <
1
↵ (i.e. under Co. A) if M lies above its boundary values
(M(q = 1↵) and M
 
q = 1↵2
 
) in this range of q. This holds as M is a continuous
and concave function in this range: Replacing g = q
↵
1 ↵ , we get
@2M
@q2
=
↵
1
1 ↵
(1  ↵)2 q
 2  11 ↵
h
↵ (q + 1)  2 + 2q  ↵1 ↵ (q↵ (1 + ↵)  1  ↵)
i
< 0
c): If q   1↵ , 4⇡(k, l = 0) = ⇡m(k)g > 4⇡(k, l   1) = ⇡m(k) (g   1) always
holds. If 1 < q < 1↵ , it can be shown that incremental profits for entrants are
larger than those of unconstrained monopolists if (Co. 2):
q   1
q
⇣
q
↵
1 ↵   1
⌘ > ↵ ↵1 ↵ (1  ↵)
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As this inequality holds if q = 1↵ , it also holds if 1 < q <
1
↵ if the left hand
side (LHS) of Co. 2 decreases in q in this range. @LHS@q < 0 holds if 1   ↵ >
q
↵
1 ↵   ↵q 11 ↵ ⌘ N (Co. 3). As @N@q < 0, Co. 3 always holds as it is satisfied with
equality for the smallest feasible value of q, i.e. for q = 1.
A2: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. For l < s, the arbitrage condition
Vl(k) =
1
r +  l
⇥
⇡lg
k   cgk ( l)1+✏ +  lVl+1(k + 1)
⇤
(A1)
must hold, with either  l =  ⇤ if @Vl(k)@ l
   
 l= ⇤
 0 or  l >  ⇤ if @Vl(k)@ l
   
 l= ⇤
> 0 (the
latter can only arise if  ⇡ locally rises in l, as in Sections 4.1 and 4.3). Iterating
equation A1 and replacing Vl(k) = Vm(k) from equation 9 for l   s, we obtain
V1(k + 1) = g
k+1⇡1   c 1+✏1
r +  1
+
s 2X
i=1
Qi
j=1  jQi+1
k=1 (r +  k)
⇥
⇡i+1   c 1+✏i+1
⇤
gk+1+i
+
Qs 1
j=1  jQs 1
k=1 (r +  k)

⇡m   c ( ⇤) 1+✏
r    ⇤ (g   1)
 
gk+s (A2)
Due to persistent leadership, l > s and   =  ⇤ hold in all industries along a
BGP.  ⇤ is determined by equation 8, with V1(k + 1) taken from equation A2. If
 l =  ⇤ for all l, V1(k + 1) increases in ⇡l, ⇡m and g and decreases in r, c and
 ⇤. These results are unchanged if  l >  ⇤ holds for some l (with  l determined
by the condition @Vl@ l = 0 because Vl is concave in  l) as the indirect eﬀects that a
variable Z has on V1(k + 1) through aﬀecting  l are of second order. The latter
holds as @Vl@ l = 0 implies that
@V1
@ l
= 0 (see A1), so that @V1@ l
@ l
@Z = 0. The result
that V1(k+1) decreases in ⇡l extends the case of a non-marginal change of ⇡l. As
the right hand side of equation 8 increases in c and in  ⇤,  ⇤ increases in ⇡l, ⇡m
and g and decreases in r and c.  ⇤ > 0 always holds if ✏ > 0 and if r >  ⇤ (g   1)
(Condition B (“Co. B”)) as the right hand side of equation 8 continuously increases
from zero to infinity if  ⇤ increases from zero to infinity, while the left hand side
(equation A2) is initially positive and then decreases continuously. As  ⇤ decreases
in r, Co. B holds if r is suﬃciently large.
Along a BGP, p = pm = 1↵ holds in all industries. Using equations 5 and 2 and
g = q
↵
1 ↵ , we obtain
y(t) = ↵
2↵
1 ↵
ˆ 1
!=0
gk(!,t)d!
31
Consequently,
G⇤ =
y˙(t)
y(t)
=
´ 1
!=0
 
gk(!,t)+1   gk(!,t)  ⇤d!´ 1
!=0 g
k(!,t)d!
= (g   1) ⇤
As c˙(t)c(t) = G
⇤ along a BGP, r > G⇤ (Co. B) needs to hold in order for U(⌧)
(equation 1) to be bounded.
For more general intertemporal preferences, r is endogenous and depends pos-
itively on G through the Euler equation. G⇤ is then determined by equation 8 (a
negative relation between G and r) and the Euler equation and Proposition 1 still
holds.
A3: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. While it is not proven that incumbents strictly prefer to do all the R&D
under forward protection, the case of persistent leadership is analyzed as, due to
equation 8, the eﬀects of forward protection on G⇤ are the same in this case and
in the (potentially possible, see online Appendix B) case where incumbents are
indiﬀerent about staying the industry leaders.
R = 1 and s > 1: Forward protection only aﬀects V1(k+1) through the profits
⇡˜1gk+1 when l = 1. As the previous incumbent can earn ⇡mgk by blocking entry
and as licensing allows to increase joint profits to ⇡mgk+1 (collusion is allowed
over the whole jointly owned product range), she is maximally willing to give
⇡˜max1 g
k+1 = ⇡m(gk+1   gk) < ⇡1gk+1 to the entrant when l = 1. The inequality
holds due to Lemma 1 c), implying that forward protection reduces G⇤ by reducing
⇡1 (see Proposition 1).
R > 1, qs = 1↵ and s > 1: Comparing profits under blocked entry and licensing,
the previous incumbent is maximally willing to leave ⇡˜maxl gk+1 = gk
 
gl   1  ⇡m
to the entrant when l  R. This is less than the profits gk+l⇡l the entrant earns
absent forward protection:
gk
 
gl   1  ⇡m = gk ⇥(g   1) ⇡m +  g2   g  ⇡m + ...+  gl   gl 1  ⇡m⇤
< gk
⇥
(⇡1g) +
 
⇡2g
2   ⇡1g
 
+ ...+
 
⇡lg
l   ⇡l 1gl 1
 ⇤
= gk+l⇡l
The inequality holds as Lemma 1 b) implies that (g   1) ⇡m < ⇡1g and that 
gl   gl 1  ⇡m  ⇡lgl   ⇡l 1gl 1 (with strict inequality when l  s). Proposi-
tion 1 therefore implies that forward protection reduces G⇤. If entrants are weak
bargainers or if R is suﬃciently large, V1(k+1) < Vm(k+1) Vm(k) might hold, in
which case forward protection eliminates all entry pressure, leading to a maximal
reduction in G⇤.
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A4: Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The value Vm(Q) of being an unconstrained monopolist supplying quality
Q can be derived from the arbitrage condition
rVm(Q) = ⇡mQ(
↵
1 ↵)   cQ( ↵1 ↵) ( m (qm))1+✏    mVm(Q) +  mVm(Q+ qm)
Inserting ( m (qm))1+✏ =
⇣
V˜1
c
⌘ 1+✏
✏ and  m =
⇣
V˜1
c
⌘ 1
✏
 (qm)
from equation 11 (V˜1 ⌘
V1(Q,qe)
Q
↵
1 ↵  (qe)
is constant along a BGP) and taking into account that Vm(Q + qm) =
Vm(Q) (qm)
↵
1 ↵ along a BGP, we obtain:
Vm(Q) = Q
↵
1 ↵
0BB@ ⇡m   c
⇣
V˜1
c
⌘ 1+✏
✏
r  
⇣
V˜1
c
⌘ 1
✏
✓
(qm)
↵
1 ↵ 1
 (qm)
◆
1CCA
Given an interior solution 1 < q⇤m < 1↵ (with r  
⇣
V˜1
c
⌘ 1
✏
✓
(q⇤m)
↵
1 ↵ 1
 (qm)
◆
> 0) exists,
the step size q⇤m that maximizes the term
(qm)
↵
1 ↵ 1
 (qm)
maximizes Vm(Q). We obtain
 ⇤m =
⇣
V˜1
c
⌘ 1
✏
 (q⇤m)
from equation 11 and
G⇤ =
⇣
(q⇤m)
↵
1 ↵   1
⌘
 ⇤m =
 
V˜1
c
! 1
✏
 
(q⇤m)
↵
1 ↵   1
  (q⇤m)
!
As q⇤m maximizes the term in the second bracket on the right hand side, it maxi-
mizes G⇤, so that q⇤m = q⇤ holds.
A5: Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Regime i): We obtain  1 =  ¯ if @V1(k)@ 1 > 0, which holds if (Co. 4):
 ⇤2 <
(r +  1) (g⇡m   c (r +  2))  ⇡1(r +  2)
(r +  1) c  (g   1) ⇡1
Given that  1 =  ¯, we can derive  ⇤2 from the free entry condition (V1(k+1) = cgk)
and obtain lim
 ¯!1  
⇤
2 =
g2⇡m
c   (r +  2) (g + 1). Plugging this into Co. 4 (note
that (r +  1) c  (g   1) ⇡1 > rc  (g   1) ⇡m > 0 under Co. C), we get
⇡m (g   1) (c (r +  1)  g⇡1) < c(r +  2)(c (r +  1)  g⇡1)
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As ⇡m (g   1) < cr < c (r +  2) due to Co. C, this condition holds if c (r +  1)  
g⇡1 > 0, i.e. if  1 > g⇡1c   r (Co. 5). If  ¯ is suﬃciently large, Co. 5 therefore
implies that  1 =  ¯ holds and  ⇤2 is interior if  ¯ >
lim
 ¯!1  
⇤
2 > 0, which holds if
 2 <
g2⇡m
(g+1)c   r (Co. 6).
Regimes ii) and iii): If  1  g⇡1c   r (Co. 7, i.e. Co. 5 does not hold),
we either have  1 =  ⇤2 =  ⇤0 =  ⇤ (Regime (ii)) or  1 =  2 = 0 and  ⇤0 =  ⇤
(Regime (iii); leapfrogging). Comparing V1(k + 1) in both regimes (V iii1 (k + 1) =
gk+1 ⇡1r+ 1+ ⇤ ; V
ii
1 (k + 1) is given by equation 12 with  1 =  2 =  ⇤), Regime ii)
arises if V ii1 (k + 1) > V iii1 (k + 1), which holds if  ⇤ <
g⇡m
c   r    2 (Co. 8).
At the regime boundary where V ii1 (k + 1) = V iii1 (k + 1),  ⇤ =
g⇡1
c   r    1 (Co.
9) holds due to the free entry condition V iii1 (k + 1) = cgk. Inserting Co. 9 into
Co. 8, we find that Regime (ii) arises if  2   1 + g(⇡m ⇡1)c and Regime (iii) if
 2 >  1 +
g(⇡m ⇡1)
c . Under C 7,  
⇤ is positive in both regimes (due to Co. 9 and
the fact that V ii1 > V iii1 in Regime (ii)).
A6: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Regime i): The fraction  l of industries in which the leading firm has an
l-step lead (is in “state l”) are constant along a BGP, implying that the follow-
ing three equations that equate expected inflows into a state (left hand sides) to
expected outflows (right hand sides) have to hold:
l = 0:  1 1 +  2 2 =  o ⇤2
l = 1:  0 ⇤2 =  1( ¯+  1)
l = 2:  1 ¯ =  2 2
These equations, with  0+ 1+ 2 = 1, can be solved for the BGP industry shares:
 ⇤0 =
 
 ¯+  1
 
 2 
 ¯+  1
 
 2 +  ⇤2
 
 2 +  ¯
 
 ⇤1 =
 ⇤2 2 
 ¯+  1
 
 2 +  ⇤2
 
 2 +  ¯
 
 ⇤2 =
 ⇤2 ¯
 
 ¯+  1
 
 2 
 ¯+  1
 
 2
  
 ¯+  1
 
 2 +  ⇤2
 
 2 +  ¯
  
Equilibrium growth in Regime i) is given by
G⇤i = (g   1)
 
 ¯ ⇤1 +  
⇤
2(1   ⇤1)
 
= (g   1)  
⇤
2
 
 2
 
 ¯+  1
 
+  ¯( ⇤2 +  2)
  
 ¯+  1
 
 2 +  ⇤2
 
 2 +  ¯
 
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Solving the free entry condition V1(k + 1) = cgk for  ⇤2, we can derive
sign
@ ⇤2
@ 1
= sign

⇡m (g   1)
r +  2
  c
 
< 0
(the inequality holds due to Condition C) and
@ ⇤2
@ 2
=  
 
 ¯c (g + 1) + c (r +  1)  g⇡1
 
 ¯c  (g   1) (c (r +  1)  g⇡1) < 0
The last inequality holds as c(r+  1)  g⇡1 > 0 (Co. 5 from Appendix A5) and as
the denominator is positive given that  ¯ is suﬃciently large. As
sign
@ ⇤1
@ 1
= sign
⇢
@ ⇤2
@ 1
 
 ¯+  1
 
 2    ⇤2 2
 
< 0,
@G⇤i
@ 1
= (g   1)
✓
@ ⇤1
@ 1
( ¯   ⇤2) +
@ ⇤2
@ 1
(1   ⇤1)
◆
< 0
holds. Moreover,
sign
@G⇤i
@ 2
=
sign
⇢
@ ⇤2
@ 2
⇥ 
 2( ¯+  1) +  ¯( 
⇤
2 +  2)
 
 2( ¯+  1) +  
⇤
2 ¯
 
 2( ¯+  1) +  
⇤
2( 2 +  ¯)
 ⇤
+ ¯( ⇤2)
2( ¯   ⇤2)
 
< 0
This derivative is negative as @ 
⇤
2
@ 2
<  g   1 under Co. 5 and for  ¯ suﬃciently
large, implying that the positive term  ¯2( ⇤2)2 in the lowest line is dominated by
the negative term @ 
⇤
2
@ 2
 ¯2( ⇤2)
2 that is part of the middle line. Therefore, G⇤i is
maximal for  2 = 0. If  2 = 0, G⇤i =  ⇤2 decreases in  1. Therefore, G⇤i is maximal
if  1 =  2 = 0.
Regime ii):  ⇤2 and therefore G⇤ii = (g   1) ⇤2 decrease in  i. This can be
inferred from the free entry condition V ii1 (k + 1) = cgk as V ii1 (k + 1) (equation 12
with  1 =  2) decreases in  i and also in  2.
Regime iii): Using Condition 9, we obtain:
G⇤iii = (g   1) ⇤ = (g   1)
⇣g⇡1
c
  r    1
⌘
Consequently, G⇤iii decreases in  1.
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Across all Regimes, G⇤ is therefore maximal if  1 =  2 = 0. At the switching
point between Regimes ii) and iii), V ii1 (k + 1) = V iii1 (k + 1) holds and there is no
discontinuous jump in  ⇤ or G⇤. At the switching point between Regimes i) and
ii), V i1 (k + 1) = V ii1 (k + 1) holds, so that there is no discontinuity in  ⇤0 and  ⇤2.
However,  1 and also G⇤ increase in a discontinuous way when a slight shift in
parameters leads so a switch from Regime ii) to Regime i).
A7: Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. With  ⇤2 = 0, we obtain V2(k + 1) =
⇡mgk+1
r+  and
V1(k) =
⇡1gk    1cgk +  1V2(k + 1)
r +  1 +  
We get  ⇤1 =  ¯ if
@V1(k)
@ 1
> 0, which holds if   < ⇡mg ⇡1c   r (Regime A) and
 ⇤1 = 0 if   >
⇡mg ⇡1
c   r (Regime B). When IP protection has expired,  ⇤0 =  ¯
holds if for any   <  ¯ the marginal benefits of doing R&D exceed the average
costs, i. e. if V1(k + 1) > cgk. This condition is satisfied (even in Regime B) if
⇡1gk+1
r+  > cg
k, i.e. if   < ⇡1gc   r (note that ⇡1gc   r > ⇡mg ⇡1c   r due to Lemma 1).
We therefore get  ⇤0 =  ⇤1 =  ¯ if    ⇡mg ⇡1c   r (Regime A),  ⇤0 =  ¯ and  ⇤1 = 0 if
⇡mg ⇡1
c   r <    ⇡1gc   r (Regime B), and  ⇤0 =  ⇤1 = 0 if   > ⇡1gc   r (Regime C).
Denoting the fraction of industries in which the leading firm has an l-step lead
(is in “state l”) by  l (l = 0 stands for expired IP protection), we obtain:
G = (g   1) ( 0 0 +  1 1 +  2 2)
Along a BGP,  l is constant and the following equations that equate expected
inflows into a state (left hand sides) to expected outflows (right hand sides) have
to hold:
l = 0:  ( 1 +  2) =  0 ⇤0
l = 1:  0 ⇤0 =  1 ⇤1 +  1 
l = 2:  1 ⇤1 =  2  = (1   0    1) 
Solving these equations for the equilibrium values  ⇤l we can deriveG⇤A = (g   1)
 ¯ ( +2 ¯)
( ¯+ )2
in Regime A and G⇤B = (g   1)  ¯  ¯+  in Regime B. In both Regimes, G⇤ increases
in  , and it therefore maximal at the boundary values  a = ⇡mg ⇡1c   r in Regime
A and  b = ⇡1gc   r >  a in Regime B. If ⇡mg ⇡1c   r > 0, G⇤A( a) > (<)G⇤B( b)
holds if  m(2 a    b) +  2a > (<) 0, that means if
 ¯(
2g⇡m   (2 + g)⇡1
c
  r) +
✓
⇡mg   ⇡1
c
  r
◆2
> (<)0
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If ⇡mg ⇡1c   r < 0,  ⇤1 = 0, so that G⇤ is maximal if   = b = ⇡1gc   r > 0 ( B > 0
holds due to Condition C).
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